Tracking stocks have been a popular form of equity restructuring in recent years. AT&T, Disney, General Motors, Sprint, US West, and many others have issued tracking stocks. While the positive announcement returns of tracking stocks are well documented, an examination of their post-issue market performance is lacking. This paper examines the postissue returns and the subsequent restructuring events through December 2000 by using a comprehensive sample of tracking stocks. We document three key results. First, we find that tracking stocks earn significantly negative buy-and-hold excess returns during a three-year period following the issue date. We also find significantly negative returns surrounding the earnings announcements during this period. This evidence contrasts with the post-issue returns of spinoffs, which are known to be positive, and of carveouts, which are known to be insignificant. Second, contrary to a common justification given to adopt tracking stocks, we find that they do not increase the transparency of firm earnings. Third, we find large positive announcement-period returns to events resulting in the elimination of tracking stock structure. JEL Classification: G12; G14; G24; G34.
Introduction
Tracking stocks are big news. On November 22, 1999, the Wall Street Journal reported that AT&T was moving closer to issuing a tracking stock for its fast-growing wireless unit. AT&T's stock rose by 11.81 percent that day. This was AT&T's biggest one-day return in a decade, even exceeding the return following the September 1995 announcement that it would spinoff its NCR computer business.
Tracking stocks were first introduced in 1984 with the creation of GME shares issued by General Motors, to track the performance of its Electronic Data Systems (EDS) division. General Motors followed with another tracking stock, GMH, to track the performance of its Hughes Aircraft division, but the next company to adopt a tracking stock was not until 1991 when USX Corp. separated its oil business from its steel business. While relatively rare until the mid 1990s, tracking stocks have become an increasingly popular form of restructuring. Many companies have issued or proposed issuing tracking stocks, including AT&T, Disney, DLJ, DuPont, General Motors, Microsoft, R.J. Reynolds, Sprint, TCI, USX Corp., US West, and WorldCom.
What are tracking stocks? These are newly-issued stocks; created by distributing a non-taxable stock dividend to existing shareholders, by an initial public offering, or as payment for target shares in a merger. A tracking stock is an equity claim intended to reflect the performance of a certain division of a multi-division firm. We refer to the old stock as the general division (GD) stock and the new stock as the tracking (TR) stock. Tracking stocks differ from spinoffs and carveouts that also divide the cash flows of the old firm. Whereas spinoffs and carveouts divide the old firm into two separate firms with distinct boundaries, tracking stocks leave it as one combined firm for legal purposes. This distinction is important, as many benefits of divestitures are believed to result from the complete separation of non-synergistic businesses. Numerous studies document that increasing firm focus by divestiture is associated with an increase in firm value, regardless of whether the divestiture is accomplished by an asset sale, a spinoff, or a carveout.
1 This benefit of divestitures is unachievable with tracking stocks. The complete separation of businesses also removes potential conflicts arising from the division of cash flows. Hass (1996) , Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996) , Billett and Mauer (2000) , D'Souza and Jacob (2000), Elder and Westra (2000) , and Zuta (2000) discuss the pros of tracking stocks. First and foremost, firms issuing tracking stocks often argue that the analysts and investors cannot understand the value of disparate businesses and therefore undervalue the combined stock. Creation of quasi pure-play tracking stocks attracts greater analyst coverage (the transparency effect) and increases attention from investors interested in different parts of the firm's business (the clientele effect). Second, tracking stocks help attract and retain top managerial talent, whose compensation can be linked to the market value of their divisions. Third, tracking stocks help in accomplishing mergers with target firms whose shareholders are less willing to exchange their stock for the stock of a large and diversified acquiring firm. Fourth, tracking stocks preserve the internal capital markets of diversified firms.
Consistent with these arguments, Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996) , Billett and Mauer (2000) , D'Souza and Jacob (2000) , and Zuta (2000) document mean announcement returns of around three percent, which are of the same order as the announcement returns for spinoffs and carveouts. 2 Billett and Mauer (2000) find a positive relation between the announcement returns and the wealth gains or losses from preserving the internal capital markets of the combined firm. The cons of tracking stocks are discussed by Hass (1996) , who argues that these are fictional stocks that may create potential conflicts of interest, arising from disproportionate ownership of the GD and TR stocks by directors and managers and sibling rivalry between shareholders of the two stocks.
This paper examines the long-term market performance of this unique form of restructuring that separates the stocks without separating the businesses. We analyze 28 TR and 19 GD stocks that were issued during 1984-1998. Our sample includes every tracking stock issued in the U.S. market during this 1 Lang and Stulz (1994) , Ofek (1995, 1999) , and Comment and Jarrell (1995) document that focus and firm value are positively related and that firm value increases when focus is improved. John and Ofek (1995) , Desai and Jain (1999) , and Vijh (1999) find that focus-increasing divestitures are associated with greater wealth gains for samples of asset sales, spinoffs, and careveouts, respectively. 2 See Hite and Owers (1983) , Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) , and Schipper and Smith (1983) for the announcement returns of spinoffs, and Schipper and Smith (1986) for the announcement returns of carveouts.
period. We first measure the buy-and-hold excess returns (BHERs) over a one-year period before the announcement date, between the announcement and issue date, and over a three-year period after the issue date. We compute these excess returns by using three different benchmarks: the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted market returns, the Media General Financial Services (MGFS) industry returns, and the CRSP size decile returns.
We find that GD stocks underperform the market and size decile benchmarks during the preannouncement period. On average, the BHERs are significantly negative. This evidence contrasts tracking stocks with spinoffs and carveouts. Desai and Jain (1999) find that pre-announcement BHERs of spinoffs are insignificant, and Vijh (1999) finds that pre-announcement BHERs of carveouts are significantly positive. The evidence supports a frequent conjecture that tracking stocks are issued in response to poor stock price performance. The industry-adjusted BHERs are insignificant, which suggests that the industry as a whole may be underperforming.
The pre-issue BHERs, spanning the period from just before the announcement date to the issue date, are generally insignificant. The post-issue returns are of the greatest interest, as this is when the TR stocks begin their lives. Over a three-year holding period starting with the issue date and ending no later than December 2000, the GD stocks earn BHERs that are negative but insignificant. However, the TR stocks earn BHERs that are negative and statistically significant with respect to all three benchmarks.
Nineteen of the 28 TR stocks underperform all three benchmarks, only five outperform all three, and four are in-between. To give some feel for the magnitude of underperformance, the TR stocks earn an average buy-and-hold return of 20.9 percent. Over an average holding period of 2.70 years, this translates into an annual raw return of 7.3 percent. In comparison, the annual market return equals 19.3 percent, the annual industry return equals 16.0 percent, and the annual size decile return equals 14.7 percent. The difference between the annual raw return and the benchmark return ranges between 7.4 and 12.0 percent, which is economically significant.
We next examine several subsets of data to test the reasons given to explain the issuance decision.
We find that none of the subset BHERs are significantly positive, while many are significantly negative.
First, during the post-issue period, the smaller TR stocks earn significantly negative returns, which are also significantly less than the returns earned by the bigger TR stocks. It appears that issuing tracking stocks linked to small divisions is not in the shareholders' interest. Second, TR stocks that partition a firm into growth and value divisions earn insignificant returns while TR stocks that achieve no such purpose earn significantly negative returns. Third, TR stocks that are issued as part of mergers earn significantly negative returns. Thus, receiving payment in the form of a TR stock instead of the acquirer's old stock does not benefit the target shareholders.
Tests of long-term returns are sometimes criticized because they cannot control for all known factors in stock returns. In comparison, tests of short-term event-period returns are free of such criticism.
We therefore examine three-day announcement-period returns for all quarterly earnings announcements of GD and TR stocks during the same three-year holding period. Consistent with the evidence on longterm returns, the earnings announcement-period returns of GD stocks are insignificant, but the earnings announcement-period returns of TR stocks are significantly negative. In fact, nearly one-third of the negative BHERs of TR stocks during the three-year holding period can be explained by the negative earnings announcement returns.
After examining stock returns, we investigate the common transparency argument given to justify the creation of tracking stocks. Using the First Call analyst forecast data, we examine the forecast errors for the combined stock during the four quarters before announcement and the separated stocks during the four quarters after issue. We find no decrease in the magnitude of forecast errors for GD stocks, but a significant increase for TR stocks. We next examine the dispersion of multiple analyst forecasts for any given quarter, and find a small decrease for GD stocks but a large increase for TR stocks. We finally examine the magnitude of the market reaction to earnings announcements. The market reaction increases for both GD and TR stocks, but the difference is not statistically significant. Overall, these tests provide evidence that is inconsistent with the increased transparency argument. There is no improvement in the transparency of GD stocks from before announcement to after issue, and there may be some deterioration in the transparency of TR stocks.
The combined evidence on three-year holding-period returns, earnings announcement-period returns, and the transparency of firm's earnings suggests that TR stocks are poor performers while the GD stocks are average performers. This evidence is inconsistent with market efficiency, although we must caution that tracking stocks are relatively new and their population is relatively small. The long-term evidence in our study contrasts with previous studies of tracking stocks that document positive market reaction on the announcement of tracking stocks. It also contrasts tracking stocks with spinoffs and carveouts. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) document that the spinoff subsidiary stocks earn significantly positive long-term excess returns, and Vijh (1999) shows that the carveout subsidiary stocks earn insignificant excess returns. If the poor long-term returns reflect problems that were not foreseen, then we would expect many reversals of the tracking stock structure in favor of the old one-stock structure. We would also expect complete divestitures of tracked businesses by spinoff or selloff. In addition, we would expect positive market reaction following the announcement of such reversals and divestitures.
To test these predictions, we investigate subsequent restructuring events of TR stocks through December 2000. Eight TR stocks have been retired (or proposed to be retired) in favor of the old onestock structure, two have been sold, and two have been spun off. In addition, two TR stocks have been acquired (or proposed to be acquired) along with their GD stock, one has been partially divested by the GD management, and one has been restructured after acquiring another firm. In most cases, the announcement of restructuring events that lead to the elimination of the tracking stock structure is accompanied by strong positive returns to both the TR and GD shareholders. For example, the eight TR stocks that were exchanged for the GD stock realize an average market-adjusted excess return of 19.0 percent, while the corresponding GD stocks realize 7.4 percent. However, the two stocks often react differently, and in a manner consistent with conflicts of interest between their shareholders as highlighted by the media reports. A study of such media reports on the announcement of restructuring events and surrounding events that lead to the elimination of tracking stock structure suggest that TR stocks often create more problems than they solve. We cite evidence of confusion among the analysts and the shareholders as to what they really own, TR shareholders complaining of unfair treatment in dividing the proceeds of restructuring, cross-liability resulting from maintaining the firm as one legal entity, and so on. Hass (1996) and many articles in the press have pointed out these problems. 3 Why the proponents of tracking stocks did not foresee these problems at the time of issuing TR stocks is not clear.
Where does that leave us? We are unable to explain the market's preference for tracking stocks as shown by the positive announcement returns. It is possible that tracking stocks are advisable in some cases and not advisable in other cases. However, we are unable to find circumstances under which tracking stocks are advisable and leave this topic to future research. The remaining paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses data and methods. Section 3 examines the market performance with longterm returns and earnings announcement returns. Section 4 examines the transparency argument, and Section 5 examines the subsequent restructuring events. Section 6 concludes.
Data and methods

Sample (universe) of tracking stocks during 1984-1998
Our sample of tracking stocks is obtained from Billett and Mauer (2000) and D'Souza and Jacob (2000) was primarily due to uncertainty regarding the tax treatment of future tracking stocks. In 1991 USX solved this problem and structured their tracking stock in such a way that it was ruled a tax-free event.
USX's example led to the wave of tracking stocks that followed. 5 Table 1 shows that one company issued tracking stocks during 1992 and 1994 and three companies issued tracking stocks during 1993 and each year from 1995 to 1998. Table 1 reports the sample characteristics. The average tracking stock has a market value of $1.6 billion and ranges from $16 million to $9 billion. The ratio of TR to GD market value averages 0.237. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) report that the ratio of subsidiary to parent 5 While the IRS has decided not to issue rulings on tracking stocks, the consensus is that for the time being they will be treated as a tax-free form of restructuring (Natusch (2000) ).
Panel B of
market value averages 0.27 for spinoffs, and Vijh (1999) reports that the ratio of offering value to the parent market value averages 0.159 for carveouts. 6 Thus, in terms of relative size, tracking stocks are comparable to other forms of equity restructuring.
Issuers cite a variety of reasons for creating tracking stocks. We find that 29 percent of tracking stocks are the result of a merger where the TR stock gives target shareholders an issue closely aligned to the performance of their old business. Transparency issues and clientele effects are almost always given to justify the issuance of tracking stock. However, we find that 29 percent of our sample of TR stocks are in the same industry as their GD stocks. Transparency and clientele effects are less likely to be the main motivation in these transactions. Finally, 39 percent of the TR stocks divide the combined stock into a growth stock and a value stock. In these cases the separated stocks may be designed to better serve the perceived investor clienteles.
Insider holdings align the interests of the managers and other insiders with the interests of the shareholders. One may argue that proportionate holdings of TR and GD stocks would motivate managers to maximize the market value of the combined firm, and disproportionate holdings would motivate them to increase one stock price at the expense of the other. Table 1 reports insider holdings collected from the first proxy statement available after the issuance of tracking stocks. On average, insiders own 3.1 percent of the TR stocks and 2.8 percent of the GD stocks. The average ratio of TR to GD holdings equals 5.36.
The median is a better indicator, and it equals 1.01. There is considerable cross-sectional variation, and most firms have insider holdings of GD stock substantially different from insider holdings of TR stock.
Although not reported, we found that the ratio of CEO holdings of TR to GD stocks is comparable to the ratio of insider holdings, but less skewed, with an average value of 0.79 and a median value of 0.87.
The returns data and the computation of excess returns
We compute excess returns by using three different benchmarks to control for the market, industry, and size effects. The computation requires the stock returns, market returns, industry returns, and size decile returns. We obtain all of these returns except industry returns from the CRSP daily return files ending in December 2000. 7 We proxy market returns by returns on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (symbol VWRETD).
Most studies of long-term returns adjust for industry effects by matching sample stocks with other stocks having the same standard industrial classification (SIC) code on CRSP or Compustat files. A recent paper by Kahle and Walkling (1996) documents that 36 percent of the Compustat and CRSP primary SIC codes disagree at the 2-digit level, 50 percent disagree at the 3-digit level, and 79 percent disagree at the 4-digit level, which questions the effectiveness of this procedure. The potential misclassification problem is more acute for tracking stocks. For example, CRSP assigns the same SIC code of 3711 to GM, GME, and GMH stocks. This code stands for "Motor Vehicles and Car Bodies", which is descriptive of GM, but not GME or GMH. We searched for alternate sources of industry classification and found a superior source in MGFS. This is a financial services concern that maintains 215 industry indexes. Their classification agrees with hard copy sources that describe the business lines of TR and GD stocks. In the preceding example, MGFS assigns industry groups of "Auto ManufacturersMajor" to GM, "Information Technology Services" to GME (now EDS), and "Communication Equipment" to GMH. The MGFS industry classification and returns data have become an industry standard and are used by numerous financial service and information providers. We use the MGFS industry returns data in our analysis, retrieved from the web-site moneycentral.msn.com (owned by the Microsoft Corporation). The data are available for the entire period of our study. However, there is one limitation, that cash dividends are excluded in computing the index returns. As a result, the true industryadjusted excess returns are likely to be more negative than our reported industry-adjusted excess returns.
We calculate that the GD and TR stocks included in our study have average annualized dividend yields of 2.82 and 1.95 percent during the sample period.
We compute long-term excess returns by subtracting the buy-and-hold market returns, industry returns, or size-decile returns from the buy-and-hold stock returns over an appropriate holding period. The resulting buy-and-hold excess returns, or BHERs, are an accurate measure of excess returns realized by the long-term shareholders of TR and GD stocks. The underlying buy-and-hold portfolio strategy is easy to implement and requires no subsequent rebalancing. We compute short-term announcement-period excess returns by subtracting the three-day cumulative market returns from stock returns. The three-day measurement period is centered on the event date, which is either the Compustat announcement date or the Wall Street Journal or Lexis/Nexis publication date. For both long-term and short-term experiments, we compute t-statistics by using the cross-sectional distribution of excess returns.
In addition to the returns data, this paper analyzes the First Call analyst forecast data obtained from the Thomson Corporation. We describe this later when we report empirical tests based on these data. Table 2 presents the BHERs of the GD and TR stocks. We examine the stock price performance over the year prior to announcing the tracking stock, the period between announcement and issue, and the three years following the issue. Over the year prior to announcement, the GD stocks earn an average 0.67 percent raw return, -16.14 percent market-adjusted return (significant at the one-percent level), -4.35 percent industry-adjusted return (insignificant), and -16.57 percent size-adjusted return (significant at the one-percent level). The medians present an almost identical picture. Ten of the 18 raw returns are negative. Thus, one plausible motivation for issuing tracking stocks may be to bolster poor stock price performance.
Long-term returns and earnings announcement-period returns
BHERs of the aggregate sample of GD and TR stocks
This evidence of negative pre-announcement performance is in stark contrast to other forms of equity restructuring. Desai and Jain (1999) find insignificant BHERs prior to spinoffs. Vijh (1999) finds that the pre-announcement BHERs of carveouts are significantly positive. If firms issue tracking stocks in an attempt to improve stock market performance, then it would be interesting to ask whether this new form of equity restructuring succeeds in improving the GD stock price performance. Table 2 shows that the BHERs of GD stocks over a three-year period starting with the issue date average -4.15, -4.86, and -0.96 percent with reference to the market, industry, and size-decile benchmarks. All figures are statistically insignificant, and arguably economically insignificant. The BHERs during the period between the announcement and issue date are also insignificant, except with reference to the industry benchmark.
Both the pre-issue and post-issue BHERs show that the GD stocks no longer underperform after the announcement of tracking stocks. On average, they earn returns that are statistically indistinguishable from their benchmarks.
The long-term returns of TR stocks may shed more light on whether these restructurings improve firm performance. Similar to spinoffs, carveouts, and equity issues, it also makes more sense to examine the performance of these newly created stocks. The evidence in Table 2 suggests that TR stocks do not outperform their benchmarks over a three-year period. In fact, they considerably underperform. The mean three-year market-adjusted, industry-adjusted, and size-adjusted BHERs equal -40.05, -28.41, and -23.76
percent. The associated t-statistics are -2.17, -2.31, and -1.85, significant at the five-percent level in the first two cases, and ten-percent level in the third case. Following Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), we also calculate skewness-adjusted t-statistics as
where n is the sample size, S is the ratio of sample average to standard deviation, and γ is the sample skewness. The skewness-adjusted t-statistics for the market-adjusted, industry-adjusted, and size-adjusted BHERs equal -2.00, -2.35, and -1.63, which compare favorably with the unadjusted t-statistics. This shows that skewness is not a major problem in our sample. To further illustrate the statistical significance, The evidence on long-term returns shows that the TR stocks are poor performers. This evidence is particularly interesting when contrasted with the announcement-period returns. Previous studies by Logue, Seward, and Walsh (1996) , Billett and Mauer (2000) , D'Souza and Jacob (2000), Elder and Westra (2000), and Zuta (2000) have documented that the announcement of tracking stocks is associated with an average positive abnormal return of around three percent. These studies interpret the positive announcement-period returns as evidence that tracking stocks benefit shareholders. Our study suggests that, at a minimum, they do not benefit the long-term shareholders of TR stocks. Table 3 reports the three-year BHERs and the industry classification for each of the GD and TR stocks in our sample. It is interesting to note that in many cases the industry classification for TR stocks is the same as that for GD stocks. Also noteworthy is the cross-sectional variation in returns. To get a better idea of the cross-sectional patterns, Table 4 examines the BHERs of TR stocks by various groups. The last panel of Table 4 lists which TR stocks are included in these groups.
Cross-sectional differences in BHERs
Panels A and B of Table 4 whether the GD stock was a poor performer during the year prior to tracking stock announcement. We find that there is practically no significant relationship between the pre-announcement performance of GD stocks and the post-issue performance of TR stocks.
Firms issuing tracking stocks often argue that they appeal to a broader investor clientele or that they enhance the firm transparency. Panel D partitions the sample into tracking stocks that divide the firm into a growth stock and a value stock vs. those that have the TR and the GD both classified as a value stock or both classified as a growth stock. We find that TR stocks that separate the firm into a growth and a value stock do not earn BHERs that are significantly different from zero. However, TR stocks that fail to create such distinctive stocks earn significantly negative BHERs. The difference between these two groups is also significant. While there is no evidence to suggest that TR stocks that distinguish growth and value divisions increase stockholder wealth, there is some evidence to suggest that TR stocks that do not provide such distinction destroy shareholder wealth.
Panel E reports the results when the sample is stratified according to whether the TR and GD stocks belong to the same industry or different industries. We find no statistical difference between the two groups, although the returns are significantly negative when the TR and GD stocks belong to different industries. Panel F breaks the sample into TR stocks that were merger related vs. the others.
Again, the BHERs of the two sub-samples are statistically indistinguishable, although the industryadjusted and size-adjusted BHERs are significantly negative for the merger-related sub-sample.
Panels G uses the insider holdings of the GD and TR to determine whether the TR stock returns are correlated with the incentives created by differential stock holdings. It shows that BHERs of cases where the insiders own a smaller percentage of GD stock than TR stock are statistically indistinguishable from cases where the insiders own a larger percentage of GD stock than TR stock. Panel H divides the sample into subsets with insider holdings of TR stock above and below the median. The BHERs of TR stocks with above median insider holdings are insignificantly different from zero, while the BHERs of TR stocks with below median insider holdings are significantly negative. However, the difference between the two subset BHERs is not significant. Finally, although not reported in Table 4 , we split the sample by using the CEO holdings in place of the insider holdings. The results are very similar.
The combined cross-sectional evidence shows that smaller TR stocks perform worse than larger TR stocks, TR stocks that do not separate the growth and value components of the old stock perform worse than those that do, but that there is no difference in performance based on pre-announcement returns, differential insider holdings, industry affiliations of the GD stock vs. the TR stock, and whether the issue is merger related. It is also remarkable that not one of the 96 subset BHERs in Table 4 is both positive and significantly different from zero.
Additional evidence on BHERs with recent issues
Appendix 1 and Table A .1 present additional evidence on the post-issue performance by using a more recent sample of tracking stocks issued between January 1999 and April 2000. The short history of these more recent TR stocks prevents us from merging this sample with our primary sample. However, the short history does not hide their poor performance. The average market-adjusted, industry-adjusted, and size-adjusted BHERs of eight TR stocks issued during this period equal -19.70, -36.19, and -31.63 percent, negative but statistically insignificant, perhaps due to the small sample size.
Long-term earnings announcement-period returns
Long-term returns should be driven by long-term earnings performance. If investors are overoptimistic about the prospects of TR stocks at the time of issue, then the earnings announcements should come as unpleasant surprises. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) use the earnings announcement-period excess returns over a three-year period to support their evidence on long-term excess returns of recent winners, and Jegadeesh (2000) uses a five-year period to support his evidence on long-term excess returns of seasoned equity offerings. This methodology has the added attraction that short-period excess returns are robust to the choice of benchmark returns. Panel A of Table 5 shows that GD stocks earn a mean excess return of 0.57 percent (t-statistic 1.20) during the pre-announcement period. This insignificant excess return suggests that, on average, the earnings announcements of GD stocks during this period are not significantly different from expectations.
We recall from Table 2 that the industry-adjusted BHERs during this period are also insignificant, but the market-adjusted and size-adjusted BHERs are significantly negative. Once again, it appears that the poor performance based on the latter benchmarks may be common to other stocks in the GD industry, and it may not reflect poor earnings performance of the GD stocks before the announcement of tracking stocks.
The excess returns during the post-issue period average an insignificant -0.08 percent (t-statistic -0.26) for GD stocks, but a significantly negative -0.94 percent (t-statistic -2.46) for TR stocks. The medians and the fraction of positive returns confirm the significance of mean returns. Panel B of Table 5 shows that, averaged across all earnings announcements in an event quarter, the mean excess return is negative in 8 out of 12 cases. For both GD and TR stocks, the post-issue earnings announcement-period excess returns are consistent with their long-term excess returns.
To explain the economic significance of TR stock announcement-period returns, it is important to discuss the choice of benchmark excess returns. The above analysis of Table 5 assumes that ex-ante the mean earnings announcement-period excess return should equal zero. This assumption is questioned by the classic Robicheck and Myers (1966) ship set-sail story. 9 Based on this theory, and using all earnings announcements during 1976 -1984 , Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988 show that the mean earnings announcement-period excess return is positive. Casual empiricism suggests that the 1990s were a period of stronger price increases, and that some of the price increases for individual stocks occurred around the strong earnings news. We therefore measure the excess returns around all earnings announcements reported on the Compustat database during 1990-1999. Excluding only stocks with a market value of less than $10 million or a stock price of less than $3 produces a mean excess return of 0.20 percent. 10 Using this benchmark for earnings surprise leads to an excess return of -(0.20+0.94) = -1.14 percent for TR stocks, with a t-statistic of -2.46×1.14/0.94 = -2.98. 11 It also changes the pre-announcement and post-issue mean excess returns for GD stocks to 0.37 and -0.28 percent, with t-statistics of 0.78 and -0.91.
An earnings announcement-period excess return of -0.94 percent per quarter explains a cumulative underperformance of around 100×(1-(1-0.0094) 11 ) = 9.87 percent over 11 announcements for TR stocks during the average holding period of 2.70 years. An excess return of -1.14 percent explains 11.85 percent. This is roughly one-third of the total long-term underperformance. The combined evidence suggests that the TR stocks are poor performers during a three-year period after the issue.
Earnings transparency of pre-announcement GD stock vs. post-issue GD and TR stocks
One commonly cited reason for issuing tracking stocks is to increase the firm transparency. This reason would imply that the earnings forecasts of the sample firms should be more accurate following the track. In other instances, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find an increase in the accuracy of earnings forecasts for a sample of spinoffs, while Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (1998) find a similar increase for a combined sample of spinoffs, carveouts, and tracking stocks. Unfortunately, Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu do not separate their results by the type of restructuring. Below we measure the impact of tracking stocks on firm transparency by collecting information on the four earnings announcements before the announcement of a track and the four announcements following the issuance.
We examine three measures of firm transparency: the magnitude of earnings forecast errors, the dispersion of earnings forecasts across analysts, and the magnitude of market reaction to actual earnings announcements. We calculate forecast errors for each quarter, defined as the actual earnings minus the average forecast all scaled by the stock price, and examine the standard deviation of forecast errors before announcement and after issue. Table 6 shows that there is no significant difference for GD stocks.
However, the evidence for TR stocks is unanimous. In all eight cases where we have adequate data, the standard deviation of forecast errors is larger for TR stocks than for the pre-announcement GD stocks.
We next analyze the dispersion of forecasts across analysts. The standard deviation of forecasts should be lower if the track increases the firm transparency. For GD stocks, we find that the average standard deviation of forecasts declines slightly after the track. The difference is small and statistically insignificant, although the number of decreases, 11, is more than the number of increases, 3, at the tenpercent level. For TR stocks the evidence is the opposite. The standard deviation of forecasts for TR stocks is three times as large as that for the pre-announcement GD stocks, and the difference is significant at the five-percent level. The non-parametric evidence is stronger. In all nine cases with adequate data, the TR stock had a larger standard deviation of forecasts than the pre-announcement GD stock.
As a final measure of transparency, we examine the market reaction to earnings announcements.
The standard deviation of the four market-adjusted earnings announcement returns to the GD stocks is slightly larger after the issue, but the difference is statistically insignificant. The corresponding increase for the TR stocks is bigger, but remains statistically insignificant.
The combined evidence of Table 6 suggests that there is no improvement in the firm transparency after the issuance of tracking stocks. There is no systematic decrease in earnings forecast errors, the dispersion of earnings forecasts across analysts, or the earnings surprise as measured by the market reaction to actual earnings announcements. There may even be some deterioration in transparency, especially for the TR stocks. This evidence contrasts tracking stocks with spinoffs that lead to improved transparency of the parent stocks as documented by Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) . It appears unlikely that the separation of stocks without the separation of underlying businesses makes the valuation of new GD and TR stocks easier than the valuation of old GD stock.
Subsequent events resulting in the elimination of tracking stocks
A number of firms adopting tracking stocks subsequently eliminate them. We examine the motivation and wealth effects of all events that result in the partial or complete elimination of tracking stocks. To identify these events, we search the Wall Street Journal and Lexis/Nexis from the date of TR issuance through December 2000. The events fall into one of four categories: formal retirement of the entire tracking stock structure, sale of assets associated with a TR stock resulting in its elimination, spinoff of a TR stock, and other miscellaneous events related to the tracking stock structure. Table 7 shows the market-adjusted excess returns earned by the TR and GD stocks following the announcement of such events.
We have two main results. First, on average, the elimination of TR stocks results in positive wealth effects for both the TR and GD stocks. Twelve out of 14 TR stocks realize positive excess returns, and five out of seven GD stocks also realize positive excess returns. Second, for a given firm, there can be substantial differences in the reaction of the TR and GD stocks. Differential price reaction suggests that the tracking stock structure successfully separates a firm into distinct economic entities. However, the differential price reaction also indicates that a tracking stock structure leads to conflicts of interest between the TR and GD shareholders. For example, a common method used to retire TR stock involves exchanging TR shares for GD shares at a pre-specified premium, resulting in a wealth transfer between the two classes of shareholders. We examine these events in detail below. Appendix 2 contains a description of the transactions used to eliminate the tracking stock structure.
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Panel A of Table 7 shows four companies that announce their intention to retire the TR stock by exchanging it for the GD stock. This group includes CMS Energy, Pittston, Fletcher Challenge, and Inco
Ltd., involving eight TR stocks and three GD stocks. The average announcement-period excess return equals 19.03 percent for the eight TR stocks, significant at the one-percent level. 13 The three GD stocks 12 The TR stock prospectus usually states the methods and conditions under which the firm can retire the TR stock. These methods include: 1. Exchanging GD shares for TR shares, typically at a 15 to 20 percent premium, 2. Selling or liquidating the assets associated with the TR division and paying the net proceeds to TR shareholders, and 3. Spinning off the TR division. Of course, following a common practice in stock transactions, at any time after issue the GD firm can make a tender offer to retire the TR shares. 13 Because the eight TR stocks belong to four firms, one may argue that the events are not independent and therefore the significance level is overstated. To address this problem, we average across all TR stocks for a given firm. The earn an excess return of 7.40 percent. These excess returns are quite large, especially compared to the 1.58 percent mean excess return associated with the announcement of adopting a tracking stock structure in Billett and Mauer (2000) . 14 We gather information on the motives for eliminating the TR structure. The managers of CMS Energy argued the TR stock had served its purpose and was no longer necessary:
"While Class G stock helped CMS Energy gain market recognition for our gas utility business when it was first issued in 1995, our gas business has since grown … to the point where having a separate tracking stock for our gas utility is no longer useful," said William T. McCormick, Jr., CMS Energy's chairman and chief executive officer.
(Source: PR Newswire, September 9, 1999.)
Pursuant to this goal, the CPG (TR) shares were exchanged for CMS (GD) shares at a 15 percent premium to the pre-announcement market value. Presumably, this premium came at the expense of GD shareholders. The announcement returns are consistent with this notion. CPG stock price went up by 14.17 percent after adjusting for the market returns while CMS stock price went down by 1.27 percent.
While the reasons given by CMS Energy suggest that the tracking stock structure may have served some useful purpose at some time, the reasons given by the managers of Pittston, Fletcher
Challenge, and Inco Ltd. for retiring TR stocks suggest that the tracking stock structure simply caused more problems than it solved. In resolving to dismantle the tracking stock structure, Mr. Kerry Hoggard, the chairman of the board of directors of Fletcher Challenge, stated:
It is clear that the Group's capital structure is seen as complex by investors, is perceived to raise governance issues, and has resulted in a significant structural discount being applied to all our stocks. We cannot allow this to continue, and will move as quickly as possible to a full dismantling of the targeted share structure. force all TR shareholders to accept the offer. The resolution passed and the meeting was described as follows:
Inco Ltd. hopes it will find corporate harmony on its board after buying out a group of shareholders whose only interest -represented by two directors -was in the nickel producer's stalled Voisey's Bay development. Despite a handful of disgruntled investors who attended a special meeting Tuesday, 84.6 per cent of the Voisey's Bay Nickel shareholders voted to approve the $195-million cash buyout which forced all other shareholders to tender their VBN shares. Inco says the move will prevent "conflict" from a group of shareholders who had a specific interest in one project of the company and two voices representing their interests on Inco's board of directors. "The whole notion of having this special class of shares has created conflict," said Alan Stubbs, Inco's vice president of public affairs. "It complicates the decision process," he said, adding that the two board members have since tendered their resignations. (Source: Canadian Press Newswire, November 28, 2000.)
Following the meeting a number of TR shareholders threatened to sue Inco over the "unfair" value they were being forced to accept. In the same story, an analyst with Morgan Stanley states: "It was probably pretty smart to buy (back the shares) now," adding that the value will go up as the project comes closer to development.
Panel B of Table 7 contains the two tracking stocks in our sample that were eliminated through an asset sale. Ralston sold the assets of its Continental Baking Group, representing by the TR stock CBG.
Interestingly, the market-adjusted returns at announcement are -9.66 percent for the TR stock and 0.85 percent for the GD stock. On the announcement date, it was unclear how Ralston would handle the transaction, although the net proceeds were roughly in line with the pre-announcement market-value of CBG. At a later date, Ralston chose to exchange the TR shares for GD shares at a 15 percent premium instead of paying the net proceeds directly to CBG shareholders.
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USX had a different experience when it sold the assets related to its Delhi Group. Unlike Ralston, USX clearly stated its intention to pay the net proceeds directly to the DGP (TR) shareholders. The DGP stock gained by 19.80 percent. In addition, the event resulted in X (a sibling TR) and MRO (GD) stocks appreciating by 3.78 and 3.69 percent after adjusting for the market returns. These figures compare favorably with the average excess return of 1.5 percent following the announcement of asset sales in general reported by John and Ofek (1995) .
Panel C of Table 7 reports that two firms in our sample spun off TR stocks. GM spun off the GME stock (now EDS), resulting in an excess returns of 7.33 percent for the GME shareholders and -1.53 percent for the GM shareholders. US West also spun off its Media One Group. The resulting excess returns were 3.99 percent for the TR shareholders, and 4.14 percent for the GD shareholders. These figures compare favorably with spinoffs in general. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) document 2.1 percent market-adjusted excess returns for their sample of spinoffs.
The terms of the spinoff of GME included a one-time payment from GME to GM. Shareholders of both GM and GME agreed that a payment was in order. However, the magnitude of the payment was a source of contention. Arguments put the payment in the range of $200 million to $1 billion:
Some large GM common shareholders and analysts believe the talks ultimately will center on a one-time payout, or dividend. "The freedom to be on your own should be worth something," said one major GM shareholder who wants GM to extract a hefty dividend from EDS for its independence. (Source: Wall Street Journal, October 9, 1995.)
Making matters more complex, GM's pension plan was one of the largest shareholders of GME stock.
The final payment was $500 million, which was 2.6 percent of GME's market value two days prior to the announcement or 8.4 percent of GM's 31 percent stake in GME. Table 7 contains all other events related to the removal of a TR stock. Following the spinoff of GME, many speculate that GMH, the remaining TR stock, is also likely to be spun off.
Panel D of
Numerous analysts continue to argue that both GM and GMH shareholders would be better off if the units were legally separated: On June 2, 1998, John F. Smith, Jr., GM's chairman, formally announced that GM had no intention to spin off Hughes. Consistent with the positive returns when spinoffs are announced, GMH earned a -7.47 percent return following the announcement. Interestingly, GM shares went up by 5.38 percent (despite the fact that a large part of GM's market value was accounted by its GMH holding).
GM has engaged in some restructuring of Hughes other than spinoff, including a sale of Hughes' defense assets to Raytheon and a swapping of GM shares for GMH shares. In the sale of assets, GM and GMH shareholders argued over the structure of the deal and the distribution of the proceeds:
GM is moving to reassure shareholders of its Class H stock -tied to the earnings of its Hughes Electronics unit -that they will be adequately compensated in the recently announced sale of Hughes' defense arm to Raytheon Corp. As recently as yesterday, top Hughes officials were holding conversations with Wall Street analysts and others about the implications of the deal. The concern of some shareholders is that GM has crafted the transaction in a way to avoid paying them the 20% recapitalization premium in GM's corporate charter. GM says its board wouldn't approve a premium and points out that last year's spinoff of its Electronic Data Systems unit didn't include such a payment. "We're continuing our dialogue to make sure everyone understands how this transaction is structured," said a GM spokeswoman. She added that GM's board had to structure the complex deal to balance the interests of all shareholders. (Source: Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1997.)
Two firms with tracking stocks agreed to be acquired. Later, one of the deals, the acquisition of Sprint by WorldCom, failed to win regulatory approval. An interesting question concerns how the acquisition premium was shared between the TR and GD shareholders. In the case of Sprint, the TR stock responded more favorably than the GD stock. In the case of TCI's acquisition by AT&T, the GD and one of the TR stocks (Liberty Media Group) earned similar market-adjusted returns of 7.80 and 8.28 percent.
However, another TR stock, the Ventures Group, earned 15.53 percent. As part of the merger, the Ventures Group shares were exchanged for Liberty Media Group shares.
The last instance in Table 7 highlights the complex issues that firms with a tracking stock structure face when they are the acquirers. Genzyme acquired Biomatrix and allocated it to one of its TR stocks. To pay for the deal, Genzyme issued new debt that became a source of conflict between the different classes of shareholders. The dispute arose from the fact that the debt would be a general corporate liability. Recall that despite the separated TR and GD stocks the firm remains one legal entity.
Both stocks are junior claims, and as such both classes of shareholders bear the deal's downside risk.
However, if everything goes well, the upside is captured only by the associated TR shareholders. These concerns were highlighted in the following report:
Genzyme shareholders are mulling over the creation of a new tracking stock that would result from an acquisition proposed by management. Two of the Genzyme Corporation's units covered by tracking stocks would buy the company, Biomatrix, using money borrowed by the parent Genzyme. While the purchase could increase the market prices of the tracking stocks, which are to be combined, the liability for the loan would ultimately fall on the parent company, leaving it to shoulder most of the risk yet receive little of the benefit. B. Kenneth West, senior consultant for corporate governance at TIAA/CREF and a director at Motorola, questions whether investors holding tracking stocks really understand what they own. "I'll bet the shareholders in these things don't know if they're on foot or horseback," he said. "But the main drawback in tracking stocks is that they create significant potential conflicts of interest among stockholders, the board of directors and management." (Source: New York Times, December 12, 2000.)
Following this report, GENZL and GZMO (both TR) stocks appreciated by 2.63 and 12.51 percent, while the GENZ (GD) stock declined by 6.21 percent.
Overall, the evidence of this section suggests that firms adopting a tracking stock structure often realize that it can create substantial conflicts of interest between the different classes of shareholders.
Attempts to eliminate this structure typically result in positive returns to all shareholders.
Conclusion
There has been a large increase in divestiture activity in the U.S. economy during the last decade.
Companies have been divesting businesses that are unrelated to their core businesses at a record pace.
Usually these divestitures take the form of asset sales, spinoffs, and carveouts. Tracking stocks are the latest addition to the list and may be thought of as pseudo divestitures. The existing stock of a diversified firm is split into two or more stocks that track the performance of different divisions. However, the firm continues to operate as one entity. This paper examines the long-term market performance of this unique restructuring that separates the stocks without separating the businesses.
We examine the market performance of every tracking stock issued in the U.S. market during 1984-1998 by using returns data through December 2000. We find that the tracking stocks are announced after a period of poor stock performance. If the restructuring is an attempt to correct poor stock performance, then one would expect an increase in firm value on the announcement of tracking stocks, assuming that the market reacts immediately, or over a period of a few years after the issuance of tracking stocks, assuming that the market reacts slowly. Previous literature has established that the announcements of tracking stocks result in positive excess returns. This paper shows that the GD stocks earn largely insignificant buy-and-hold excess returns between the announcement and issue dates and over a threeyear period after the issue date. However, the TR stocks earn significantly negative returns during this three-year period. The poor long-term returns correspond to poor earnings performance as measured by the short-term earnings announcement-period returns.
We directly examine a frequent explanation given for why the tracking stocks may increase the combined firm value. It is argued that the tracking stocks increase firm transparency, which would imply more accurate analyst earnings forecasts after the track. Our evidence is inconsistent with this argument.
On average, there is no evidence that the post-issue GD stocks are more transparent than the preannouncement GD stocks, and there is some evidence that the post-issue TR stocks are less transparent than the pre-announcement GD stocks. Our last investigation focuses on the subsequent restructuring of TR stocks. We find that in a large number of cases the tracking stock structure is eliminated by exchanging the TR stock for the GD stock, selling the TR assets, or spinning off the TR stock. The investors, analysts, and press reporters react positively to the announcement of such events. Further analysis suggests that in many cases this positive reaction is a relief over the elimination of confusion and conflicts of interest between the TR and GD shareholders.
The long-term market performance of tracking stocks contrasts this new form of equity restructuring with spinoffs and carveouts. Previous literature shows that the market performance of newly-created firms by spinoff exceeds benchmarks, and that the market performance of newly-created firms by carveout is comparable to benchmarks. In conclusion, our evidence suggests that restructuring by tracking stocks is not in the interests of shareholders. Managers should consider other forms of divestiture or more carefully weigh the costs and benefits of tracking stocks in their specific situation. Table 1 Sample distribution and market values of firms that issued tracking stocks during 1984-1998.
The sample of tracking stocks is obtained from Billett and Mauer (2000) and D'Souza and Jacob (2000) . It includes all of the tracking stocks issued in the U.S. market during 1984-1998. After issue, the firms have two classes of stocks: GD, the general division stock, and, TR, the tracking stock. There is only one GD stock, but there may be one or more TR stocks. In the singular case of Fletcher Challenge Group, there are four comparable-size stocks after the issue date of March 25, 1996, which are all classified as TR stocks. Eight firms in our sample issued tracking stocks once during the sample period (Ralston Purina Group, CMS Energy Corp., US West Inc., Inco Ltd., Conectiv Inc., Georgia Pacific Corp., Circuit City Stores Inc., and Sprint Corp.). Six firms issued tracking stocks twice (General Motors Corp., USX Marathon Group, Pittston Company, Fletcher Challenge Group, Genzyme Corp., and TCI Inc.). The market value of both the GD and the TR stocks is calculated by multiplying the first closing price after issue by the number of shares outstanding. The motivations for issuing tracking stocks are obtained from various media reports, and the insider ownership data are obtained from the first proxy statement available after the issue date. 1984 1985 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Ratio of TR to GD insider holdings 5.36 0.00 1.01 54.00 Table 2 Buy-and-hold excess returns (BHERs) of GD (general division) and TR (tracking) stocks issued during 1984-1998.
Year
Our sample includes all of the tracking stocks issued in the U.S. market during 1984-1998. The BHERs are calculated three different ways. The first procedure subtracts the cumulative market returns from the cumulative stock returns over the concerned holding period. The market returns are measured by the CRSP value-weighted returns including dividends (VWRETD). The second procedure subtracts the relevant industry returns from stock returns. The industry group is identified by using the Media General Financial Services (MGFS) data retrieved from the web site moneycentral.msn.com. The MGFS classification uses 215 industry groups, and it provides more accurate industry classification than CRSP or Compustat SIC codes as explained in the text. MGFS provides valueweighted industry indexes that exclude dividends, from which we calculate returns. The third procedure subtracts the appropriate size and exchange-based decile returns from stock returns. The decile returns are obtained from the CRSP files and include dividends. In all cases, the post-issue holding period stops on the third anniversary of the issue date, the date the TR stock is sold or spun off, or December 31, 2000, whichever comes first. The preannouncement returns are computed over a one-year period ending 3 days before announcement date, the pre-issue returns are computed from 3 days before the announcement date to the issue date, and the first, second, and thirdyear returns are computed over one-year periods starting with the issue date. The mean, the t-statistic, the median, and the frequency of positive vs. negative BHERs are all calculated from the cross-sectional distribution of return differences. The notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Table 4 Cross-sectional patterns in the buy-and-hold excess returns (BHERs) of TR stocks issued during 1984-1998.
Our sample includes all of the tracking stocks issued in the U.S. market during 1984-1998. The BHERs are calculated three different ways. The first procedure subtracts the cumulative market returns from the cumulative stock returns over the concerned holding period. The market returns are measured by the CRSP value-weighted returns including dividends (VWRETD). The second procedure subtracts the relevant industry returns from stock returns. The industry group is identified by using the Media General Financial Services (MGFS) data retrieved from the web site moneycentral.msn.com. The MGFS classification uses 215 industry groups, and it provides more accurate industry classification than CRSP or Compustat SIC codes as explained in the text. MGFS provides valueweighted industry indexes that exclude dividends, from which we calculate returns. The third procedure subtracts the appropriate size and exchange-based decile returns from stock returns. The decile returns are obtained from the CRSP files and include dividends. In all cases, the holding period stops on the third anniversary of the issue date, the date the TR stock is sold or spun off, or December 31, 2000, whichever comes first. For means, significance levels are based on t-statistics, and differences in means are based on t-statistics assuming equal variances across groups. Univariate median tests are based on Wilcoxin sign rank statistics and difference in medians significance levels are based on Wilcoxon rank sums test statistics. The notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Table 6 Earnings transparency of pre-announcement GD stocks vs. post-issue GD and TR stocks issued during 1984-1998.
Our sample includes all of the tracking stocks issued in the U.S. market before 1998. We obtain the analyst forecast data from First Call, and the earnings announcement dates from Compustat, First Call, and Lexis/Nexis (in that order). Forecast errors are the difference between the actual earnings per share and the mean forecast scaled by the stock price on the first day of the month of forecast. The standard deviation of forecasts is the standard deviation of individual analyst forecasts divided by the stock price. Announcement returns are computed by subtracting the market returns from the stock returns over a three-day period centered on the earnings announcement date. Market returns are measured by the CRSP value-weighted returns. Pre-announcement figures are based on the four quarterly earnings announcements before the announcement of the tracking stock, and post-issue figures are based on the four quarterly earnings announcements after the issuance of the tracking stock. The notations *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Table 7 Market reaction to the announcement of second events after the issuance of tracking stocks.
For each TR stock issued during 1984-1998, we examine media reports through December 2000 to uncover subsequent announcements that would result in removal of the TR stock or sale of assets associated with the TR stock. The announcements are classified into the four panels shown below. Excess returns are computed by subtracting the market returns from the stock returns over a three-day period centered on the announcement (publication) date. Market returns are measured by the CRSP value-weighted returns. Table A .1 shows that six out of eight TR stocks earn negative raw returns and negative BHERs using all three benchmarks. Only one TR stock -Celera Genomics Group -earns positive BHERs using all three benchmarks. The average market-adjusted, industry-adjusted, and size-adjusted BHERs equal -19.70, -36.19, and -31.63 percent, negative but insignificant, perhaps due to the small sample size. This new evidence looks similar to the old evidence in Table 2 . Finally, the BHERs of GD stocks created during 1999-2000 are positive but insignificant. 
